होमAsian CricketThe New Power Structure of Asian Cricket: Asia Cup, Franchise Leagues and the Politics of Revenue
Asian Cricket
The New Power Structure of Asian Cricket: Asia Cup, Franchise Leagues and the Politics of Revenue
एशियाई क्रिकेट का भविष्य तीन कारकों पर निर्भर करता है: (1) एशिया कप और आईसीसी आयोजनों का स्थायी, राजनीति-प्रतिरोधी कैलेंडर; (2) आईसीसी के 2024-27 राजस्व मॉडल में बाजार-आकार और विकास-जरूरत के बीच संतुलन; और (3) फ्रेंचाइजी लीगों के विस्तार के बीच खिलाड़ियों के कार्यभार पर क्षेत्रीय सहमति। हाइब्रिड-मॉडल मेजबानी (2023 एशिया कप, 2025 चैंपियंस ट्रॉफी) ने दिखाया कि राजनीतिक तनाव के बावजूद टूर्नामेंट जारी रखे जा सकते हैं, लेकिन यह अस्थायी व्यवस्था है, स्थायी समाधान नहीं। भारत-पाकिस्तान द्विपक्षीय क्रिकेट 2012-13 के बाद से नहीं हुआ, जिससे छोटे एशियाई बोर्डों की राजस्व निर्भरता बढ़ी है। निष्कर्ष: एशियाई क्रिकेट आर्थिक रूप से मजबूत पर प्रशासनिक रूप से सबसे जटिल दौर में है।
Over the past decade, the centre of gravity in Asian cricket has shifted from the field to the boardroom. Regional tournaments such as the Asia Cup, franchise leagues like the IPL, PSL, LPL, BPL and ILT20, and the ongoing debate over ICC revenue distribution — these three axes together are shaping where the cricket of the subcontinent goes in the next decade. To understand this shift, the sport must be viewed not only through the scoreboard but through the economic and administrative machinery running behind it.
The Asian Cricket Council's (ACC) biggest test has always been politics, not cricket. The 2026 Asia Cup was played under a 'hybrid model' — Pakistan held hosting rights, but India's matches were played at a neutral venue. The same formula was repeated for the 2026 ICC Champions Trophy. Both examples show that a technical route to keeping a tournament alive despite political tension can be found, but it comes at a cost: uncertain scheduling, confusion for audiences and risk for sponsors. The hybrid model is not a solution; it is a permanent temporary arrangement.
At the bilateral level, no series has been played between India and Pakistan — the last bilateral engagement was in 2026-13. This has affected more than those two teams. The revenue models of boards such as Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Afghanistan depend substantially on tours by India. When the ecosystem of big series contracts, the smaller boards are hit first. This is why Asian cricket has developed a 'centre-periphery' structure, with one board at the economic centre and the rest on the periphery.
Franchise leagues have made this structure even more explicit. The IPL's media rights for the 2026-27 cycle sold for roughly ₹48,390 crore, making it the most valuable property in world cricket. The PSL, LPL, BPL and ILT20 have carved out their own space, but the financial gap between them and the IPL is wide. The consequence is that a single player turns out in four or five different leagues across a year, while his home board remains financially dependent on that same player. Players such as Babar Azam, Shaheen Afridi, Rashid Khan and Wanindu Hasaranga are the clearest examples of this dual system — their brand is built in franchise cricket, yet accountability remains with the national team.
The ICC's 2026-27 revenue model has institutionalised this imbalance. In this cycle the Indian board receives the largest share of total revenue, a direct consequence of the IPL and the Indian media market. The logic is simple — whoever brings the market money gets the bigger share. But the limit of that logic is that it ties the development of the game to the size of the market rather than to need. Boards such as Pakistan and Sri Lanka have consistently voiced discomfort on precisely this point.
The effect on the talent pipeline is most visible in cases like Afghanistan. Afghanistan long lacked a domestic structure, but its players were forged in Pakistan and other franchise leagues, and the team is today a competitive T20 unit. This proves that franchise cricket can become an 'export-oriented' development mechanism for talent — but it is not sustainable, because it cannot replace a national domestic structure; it can only paper over its absence.
The list of risks is long. First, scheduling: national team tours, ICC tournaments and franchise league windows are stacking on top of each other. From managing names like Rohit Sharma and Virat Kohli to the workload of emerging fast bowlers, every board is being forced to decide which tournament gets priority. Second, the risk of mental fatigue and injury, which grows with continuous cricket and travel. Third, the financial vulnerability of smaller boards — if a season passes without a series against India, their budgets come under direct pressure. Fourth, the polarisation of audiences, in which political tension directly affects the mood at the ground and the value of broadcast rights.
Amid all this there is a positive side. The depth of Asian teams is better than before. Sri Lanka's bowling attack, Bangladesh's all-rounder pool, Afghanistan's spin attack and India's bench strength have together ensured that Asian cricket is no longer a one-team sport. Tournaments like the Asia Cup are the cheapest and fairest stage on which to test that depth, because both points and prestige are at stake.
The way forward is clear, even if not easy. First — a stable calendar in which the windows for franchise leagues and national cricket do not collide. Second — giving 'development need' an explicit weight alongside 'market size' in revenue distribution, so that smaller boards can invest in their domestic structures. Third — a regional consensus on player workload, because no single board can solve this alone. Fourth — a pre-agreed neutral-venue mechanism for political tension, so that a last-minute scramble is not required every time to save a tournament.
Asian cricket today stands in its strongest financial position and its most complex administrative position at the same time. This contradiction is its central question: will the region be able to convert its market strength into the broader good of the game, or will the market continue to decide everything? The Asia Cups and ICC cycle decisions of the next three to four years will answer that question.



